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I. Introduction
A. Whose Program Is It?
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson's signature brought the Medicare
program to life. Initially, this statutory creation did not receive an open-armed
welcome from the majority medical establishment. For decades, the American
Medical Association had fought against such legislation, condemning the very
concept of government-financed health care insurance as "socialism."' In the
ensuing years, Medicare evolved from being vilified as an unwanted interloper
that disrupted the doctor-patient relationship, to being vilified for not paying
enough for the privilege of interfering. Physicians, hospitals, and medical
I. The National Medical Association, representing the minority medical establishment,
had for an equally long period argued that the government must intervene to assure that all
Americans have access to health care services. See 55 J. NAT'L MED. Ass'N 464 (1963)
(describing how this association of black physicians wanted the government to intervene to
assure all Americans were able to access health care services). For a fuller discussion of the
genesis of Medicare and its legislative intent to create a health care safety net for all Americans,
see Phyllis E. Bernard, Social Security and Medicare Adjudications at HHS: Two Approaches
to Administrative Justice in an Ever-Expanding Bureaucracy, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 339, 384-90
(Summer 1993), at http://heinonline.org/HeinOnline/show.pl?handle=hein.joumals/imax3&d
=345&size=4 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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schools may have begrudgingly embraced Medicare, but embrace it they did,
nevertheless.
Medicare reimbursed capital expenses, including depreciation and other
long-term financing costs, in ways that fueled the construction of ever-
improving health care facilities.2 Health care grew from a profession to an
industry, complete with a publicly-traded, for-profit segment holding some of
the hottest stocks on Wall Street.' Medical schools came to rely upon millions
in Medicare revenues from faculty practice plans along with more millions for
the ephemeral, additional costs of graduate medical education.
With the infusion of over 200 billion Medicare dollars annually, health
care services now constitute one of the largest industries in the country.
Medicare serves about forty million elderly and disabled persons annually and
pays "nearly I million hospitals, physicians and other health care providers."5
In 2000, the Medicare program represented about 11% of the federal budget.6
According to colloquial labels for power relationships, Medicare surely
qualifies as "the 800-pound gorilla" that sits "wherever it wants."
A skeptical observer might question the marginal role the beneficiary-
patient plays in the perennial Medicare debates. Relative to those whose
incomes derive from Medicare payments, the beneficiary-patient has only a
2. Some of the most exhaustive debates concerning costs and payment methodologies
came with the 1983 transition to prospective payments. For a compilation and analysis of issues
and proposals regarding Medicare's prospective payment system, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, HRD-86-93, MEDICARE: ALTERNATIVES FOR PAYING HOSPrrALCAPITALCOSTS: REPORT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (Aug. 1986).
3. The fertile soil nurturing the original growth of proprietary hospitals was Medicare
payment policies paying the cost, plus a return on equity. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
HRD-79-63, MEDICARE: EVALUATION OF A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE MEDICARE EQUITY RETURN
PAYMENTS TO FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS 34 (1979) (asserting that the for-profit hospital industry is
considered a profitable and attractive investment).
4. This has been a long-standing issue for the Medicare program from the seventies
through the nineties. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERALOF
THE U.S., HEW-#22-SSA, PROBLEMS PAYING FOR SERVICES OF SUPERVISORY AND TEACHING
PHYSICIANS IN HOSPITALS UNDER MEDICARE, REPORT TO CONGRESS (Nov. 17, 197 1); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-HEHS-94-33, MEDICARE: GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION POLICY
NEEDS TO BE REEXAMINED, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 10 (1994) (finding that in
1992, Medicare's payments to the 1,250 teaching hospitals in the country for graduate medical
education amounted to $5.2 billion).
5. This paragraph contains standard background information included in most U.S.
General Accounting Office reports concerning aspects of the Medicare program. These
particular statistics come from U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-817, MEDICARE
MANAGEMENT: CMS FACES CHALLENGES TO SUSTAIN PROGRESS AND ADDRESS WEAKNESSES,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 3 (2001).
6. Id.
1419
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1417 (2003)
muted voice. This outcome should not surprise us. It is the logical result of
having relegated the recipient of services to the sidelines. In so doing, health
care for seniors and the disabled has increasingly veered away from doctor-
patient relationships of long duration and substantial trust, and towards high-
intensity, invasive tertiary care that increases revenues to providers, but does
not increase satisfaction to the patient.7
B. Using Mediation to Refocus Medicare on the Doctor-Patient
Relationship
This Article proposes that we reorient Medicare. Medicare should refocus
financing in ways designed to sustain a collaborative doctor-patient
relationship, emphasizing primary care fitting the level of support the
beneficiary and her family prefers. Such a reorientation would shift the
direction of Medicare from provider-oriented to beneficiary-centered.8 The
mechanism for effecting this change would be mediation aimed at developing a
collaborative medical treatment plan. This plan would establish principles for
7. Assessments of consumer satisfaction or dissatisfaction are difficult to craft. For
purposes of the present discussion we shall assume-in line with the positions the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) often takes and HHS sometimes takes--that quality programs to deal
with beneficiary complaints need improvement. Consider, for example, the recent report by the
HHS's Office of the Inspector General, Doc. No. OEI-01-00-00060, THE MEDICARE
BENEFICIARY COMPLAINT PROCESS: A RusTY SAFETY VALVE (Aug. 2001), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov.oei/ reports/oei-01-00-00060.pdf [hereinafter OIG]. This found the medical
Peer Review Organizations (PROs) designated to bridge quality of care and consumer complaint
response did not optimally handle either role. Some 13% of beneficiary complaints in a period
from 1997 to 1999 involved problems with quality. Id. But, beneficiary complaints were
treated "as a distinctly minor activity." Id. Instead, the PROs tended to be "more oriented
toward the medical community than to the beneficiary community." Id. This left most
beneficiaries with few identifiable means to present a complaint about quality of care, not
payment for services. Id. OIG recommended the establishment of a complaint process outside
of the PRO system that would include mediation. Id.
8. The call for such a reorientation is not entirely new. Professor Rand Rosenblatt
identified the potentially corrosive effect of cost containment upon the doctor-patient
relationship as early as the mid-1980s with regard to Medicaid. See Rand E. Rosenblatt,
Medicaid Primary Care Case Management, The Doctor-Patient Relationship, and the Politics
of Privatization, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 915, 919-20 (1986) (asserting that "primary care case
management" acts as a cost containment strategy that creates a financial incentive to deny
adequate care to the poor). At that time, he promoted a "patient-centered ideal" as the
"preeminent factor in the doctor-patient relationship and in the making of health policy." Id. at
939. He recognized the connection between "reimbursement and coverage decisions and the
dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship." Id. Further, he offered ways to "operation-alize"
the patient-centered ideal by having consumers directly represented in the provider's
administrative structure. Id at 938. Although this paper clearly embraces a patient-centered
ideal, we shall analyze and seek to "operation-alize" this ideal as a person-to-person interaction.
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anticipated hospitalizations and other tertiary care, establishing the balance of
services (degree of intensity and invasiveness), and institutionalized versus
non-institutionalized long-term care that comports with the patient's
preferences. Mediation between the patient, the patient's relevant family
member(s), and the medical team would facilitate efficient use of known
Medicare (and other) resources.
A third-party neutral trained in the skills of restating and refraining to
build consensus can: (1) reveal mistaken assumptions and unrealistic
expectations; (2) identify shared values so that services meet underlying needs;
and (3) address otherwise unarticulated and poorly managed anxieties. A
nonstakeholder can bring confidence in the process itself specifically because
this neutral person is not a member of the medical team, nor a designated
patient representative (whom the medical team could view as an adversary).
The use of trained neutral parties can assure fairness as a matter of system
design, not relying primarily upon the right blend of temperaments to achieve
optimal communication.
Does this matter? Dr. Jeffrey Kang, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services' (CMS) chief clinical officer, has been quoted as saying, "Most
beneficiary complaints against Medicare providers aren't [sic] due to bad
clinical care, but instead are the result of inadequate communication between
the patient and the physician." 9 Dr. Kang endorsed mediation to provide
beneficiaries "a little more satisfaction" in the postdispute complaint process.'0
This Article proposes offering both the patient and medical team much greater
satisfaction by sequencing mediation at a predispute, preventative stage.
Such sequencing could address the complex human relations issues at the
root of beneficiary complaints profiled by HHS's Office of Evaluations and
Inspections in the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). For example, the
study showed that initial confusion about the appropriate use of medications
often emerged later as technical quality concerns questioning "clinical expertise
and decisions."" Service quality concerns comprised approximately 14% of
beneficiary complaints. 12 These complaints generally resulted from negative
interactions between beneficiaries, their family caregiver, and medical or
nursing staff.'3 That difficult experience often stemmed from a health care
9. Ed Lovern, "Gotcha" Gives Way to Guidance; Quality Improvement Behind Plan to
Change Medicare Review Groups'Image, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 17, 2001, at 20.
10. Id.
11. 0IG, supra note 7, at 23. Such incidents comprised approximately 74% of
beneficiary complaints reviewed. ld. at 24.
12. Id.
13. See id. (citing examples of beneficiary complaints that raise concerns regarding the
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professional's narrow focus on efficiency. Complaints stated that health care
providers inadvertently overlook "solicitude with patients" and "friendliness,"
both cited by OIG as major beneficiary concerns. 14 Although some people
might read the terms "solicitude" and "friendliness" as minor issues, the facts
from which they arise represent core factors in the treatment dynamic.'5
This Article also proposes that all the services Medicare provides pursuant
to such a mediated plan would be paid without delay. This offers a substantial,
tangible incentive for full participation by the beneficiary and by the
practitioner. They both need incentives to undertake a process that HHS's OIG
recognizes as "labor-intensive"'16 and "a burden,"' 7 which operates under the
perpetual cloud that "there is likely to be a perceived imbalance of power
between the participants."' 8 0 IG posited that these factors partially explain the
low rates of participation in the five limited pilot mediation projects reviewed
as of August 2001.19 In the OIG study, Peer Review Organizations (PROs)
extended offers to mediate complaints fifty-eight times.2 ° Only twenty-eight
beneficiaries and only eleven providers mediated.2
Placing the mediation process at the predispute/pregrievance/precomplaint
stage substantially reduces the need to sort through which types of complaints
would be appropriate or inappropriate for mediation.22 Vastly improved
communication may largely prevent disputes rising to the level of grievances or
quality of service delivered by medical and nursing staffs).
14. Id. at 23.
15. The report offers two tangible examples: (1) A surgical center transferred a
beneficiary by wheelchair to a hospital six blocks away, dressed only in a hospital gown, with
his family following behind. Id. at 24. This was perceived as seriously disrespectful of his
dignity. Id. Not surprisingly, complications arose and the family cited the inappropriate
conditions of the transfer as part of their complaint concerning the quality of technical services.
Id.; (2) The wife of a beneficiary receiving services in a rehabilitation center did not receive
regular updates from nursing staff about his health. Id. She had special concerns about his
decrease in appetite. Id. This exacerbated her anxiety about the technical quality of care her
husband received, especially when he was later discharged while still fighting an infection. Id.
These became complaints about both service and technical quality. Id.
16. Id. at 10.
17. See id. ("Bringing together a beneficiary and provider Or practitioner can present a





22. This is an unanswered question the OIG presented as it recommended larger-scale
experimentations in mediation of beneficiary complaints. See id. (making the recommendation
for larger-scale experimentation).
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complaints. Placing the mediation at the formation stage in the doctor-patient
relationship-before the beneficiary's health has deteriorated and before a
dispute has raised the emotional stakes-lifts yet another serious burden from
the beneficiary. 23 Finally, institutionalizing these mediated dialogues and
making payment contingent upon the resulting treatment plan assures follow-up
to protect the interests of beneficiaries, as the OIG requested.24
The mediated treatment plan, once institutionalized, could substantially
reduce the future volume of appeals for denials of claims and coverage. It can
offer a mechanism to assure compliance with HHS's treatment guidelines,
especially for chronic conditions.23 It offers an appropriate, compassionate
means to address access and end-of-life decisions.26 This process, however,
takes time and deserves compensation. Thus, the mediation time of the medical
team should be separately paid as a billable service. By making such
mediations standard procedure, the Medicare program could emerge as the
salvation of the doctor-patient relationship it has been accused of destroying.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and the medical establishment have
a growing acquaintanceship. In the 1990s mediation became the policymakers'
dispute resolution mechanism of choice for handling denials of services by
managed care organizations.27 Some experience has been gained, although not
all of it has been encouraging. 28 Most importantly, one must ask whether any
23. This responds to the point OIG raised regarding the potential burden placed on a frail
beneficiary to meet with a provider or practitioner. See id. (discussing burdens).
24. See id. (asking how mediation would serve as a beneficiary protection if there is no
intervention or follow-up after the mediation).
25. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-HEHS-97-48, MEDICARE: MOST
BENEFICIARIES WITH DIABETES Do NOT RECEIVE RECOMMENDED MONITORING SERVICES, REPORT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 20 (1997) (determining how well the health care system provides
preventive services for patients with diabetes and finding that patients who receive the
recommended levels of preventive services experience an enhanced quality of life); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO 02-422, MEDICARE: BENEFICIARY USE OF CLINICAL PREVENTIVE
SERVICES, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 6 (2002) (detailing the
lack of coordination and underuse of basic preventative care).
26. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-8, MEDICARE HOME
HEALTH: DIFFERENCES IN SERVICE USE BY HMO AND FEE-FOR-SERVICE PROVIDERS, REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING (1997).
27. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) took the lead in
developing a template for ADR use in managed care settings. The federal government and the
states have followed this template. An excellent review of these various methods for handling
managed care complaints is presented in Jennifer E. Gladieux, Medicare+Choice Appeal
Procedures: Reconciling Due Process Rights and Cost Containment, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 61
(1999).
28. The American Bar Association Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly
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unrepresented patient can effectively mediate with the gatekeeper who seeks to
deny the services the patient perceives as essential to life or to an acceptable
quality of life. The medical institutions hold power that dwarfs the power of
the vulnerable patient. How can mediation achieve balance and thus fairness in
such negotiations? Taking it a step further, how can one structure an equitable
mediation in which the patient confronts not only the medical establishment,
but the federal government, in the form of the Medicare program?
C. Mediating the Dynamics of Power
This Article explores the issues of power, balance and collaboration in a
specialized context. This proposal strategically places mediation at an earlier
stage in the process than is typical. The proposed design would compel
mediation before a serious dispute or claim has arisen. Mediation after conflict
strains the power balance even further, accentuating the emotional stakes for
the patient and the patient's family. Can the negotiating table ever be "even"
under such circumstances? With this in mind, the proposal presented here
suggests mediation in a preventative, pro-active role, rather than merely
attempting damage control after the dispute is already forming into a matter for
litigation.
Part II of this Article offers an overview of how ADR has been used in the
Medicare program to date. More pointedly, it considers a framework for
understanding the proper or improper usage of ADR processes in a publicly
funded program. Part Il presents a paradigm for understanding power
relationships between the Medicare program, providers, practitioners, and
beneficiaries. Conflicts involving the doctor-patient relationship should be
resolved at a time and in a manner that neutralizes the power balancing issues
arising in standard ADR processes. Part IV presents a working model of
empowerment by using trained mediators to facilitate the development of
conducted an 18-month study of managed care organizations' internal dispute resolution
practices. As reported in Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Health Plan Internal Consumer Dispute
Resolution Practices: Highlights from a National Study, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL. 283,323
(2002), ADR methods can be a helpful complement to the standard adjudicatory appeals system.
Karp and Wood quote the American Association of Health Plans as endorsing ADR because its
"comparatively informal and non-adversarial techniques" contribute to "preserving partnerships
between health plans and their members." Id. A leading expert on Medicare appeals processes
expresses doubt, however, about the waiver of judicial remedies. Is such a waiver truly
knowing? See Eleanor D. Kinney, Resolving Consumer Grievances in a Managed Care
Environment, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 147, 163 (Winter 1996) (finding contractually imposed ADR
procedures that take the place of court proceedings are especially suspect because they eliminate
a range of judicial protections with which patients presumably are familiar).
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comprehensive medical treatment plans in collaboration with the patient and
the patient's family.
II. Are Medicare and Mediation Compatible?
A. A Brief Overview of ADR in the Medicare Program
1. Justice on a Mass Scale
Like most federal agencies designated as the primary interface
between the public and the government, the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), now known as the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS), has sought to be efficient, fair, and user-
friendly. These goals in theory are unquestionable. In practice, however,
they prove not only elusive but often contradictory.
The annual volume of Medicare cases that HCFA/CMS faces
requires that justice be processed through mass production quite unlike
the image of litigated, individualized justice dispensed in the court room.
If millions of beneficiaries, providers, and suppliers are to receive some
sort of hearing concerning a dispute with the program, fairness requires
attention to the mundane, unglamorous features of due process. The
chosen system for resolving disputes over payments cannot attempt to
replicate the formal APA trial-type proceeding. It would prove too slow,
too varied in result, and too costly. 29
Medicare disputants need a response in a fairly short period of time,
especially when the answer makes a fundamental difference in a
beneficiary's course of treatment, or in the fiscal viability of a provider
institution. Results must be consistent enough to assure the public that
their government has not acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Actions must be sufficiently predictable that businesspeople can make
realistic plans. And, the final prong of the Mathews v. Eldridgea° due
process test looms ever larger as the volume of cases also grows.3
29. Professor Jerry L. Mashaw's classic book on the Social Security Disability Program
convincingly articulated this concept ofjustice on a mass scale, its elements, and its impact. See
generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS (1983).
30. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
31. See id. at 335 (ruling that the government's interest acts as one of three factors that
must be considered for due process analysis, including the fiscal and administrative burdens the
additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail).
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Namely, administrative costs for maintaining an adjudicatory process
must be affordable even when multiplied by an extraordinary volume of
cases.
32
2. Streamlining and Humanizing Medicare Adjudications
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) addressed these considerations
to develop thoughtful, neutral studies and recommendations designed to
meet the goals of efficiency, fairness, and accessibility for the lay public.
In 1986, ACUS determined that the Medicare appeals system was a
"patchwork with differing administrative and judicial review
requirements" that needed to be rationalized.33 By the end of ACUS's
funding period, several modifications were under study, including a
proposal to bring ADR to the Part A adjudications the Provider
Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) handles.
ACUS first presented the proposal in 1992, and completed and
published the report in 1995. The report suggested that the PRRB's
adjudicatory functions be reduced or eliminated entirely, replaced by
ADR, possibly through the HHS Departmental Appeals Board (DAB).
3 4
Those who utilized PRRB adjudicatory services-within the government
and within the provider community-expressed remarkable willingness to
undertake such a change.35 In 1998, CMS determined that the time for
32. See Jennifer L. Wright, Unconstitutional or Impossible: The Irreconcilable Gap
Between Managed Care and Due Process in Medicaid and Medicare, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL. 135 (Winter 2000) (arguing that "managed care, as currently constituted" fails the due
process test). Specifically, Professor Wright argues that it is "inherently unconstitutional in the
Medicaid and Medicare context" because "each medical treatment decision is conflated with a
Medicaid/Medicare coverage decision, and these decisions are made by care providers and
managed care organizations that are subject to systemic incentives to deny even covered care."
Id. at 135.
33. ACUS Recommendation No. 86-5, § 305.86-5 Medicare Appeals, 51 Fed. Reg.
46,987 (December 30, 1986).
34. PHYLUs E. BERNARD, ACUS, ADJUDICATING MEDICARE HOSPITAL PAYMENT DISPUTES:
ISN'T THERE A BETTER WAY? A REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES (1995). The "director's cut" was published as an article in the Administrative Law
Review in 1997. See Phyllis E. Bernard, Empowering the Provider: A Better Way to Resolve
Medicare Hospital Payment Disputes, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 269, 339-40 (1997) [hereinafter
Bernard, Empowering the Provider] (presenting a model to reconfigure the PRRB's appeals
process by including ADR procedures that have the HHS Departmental Appeals Board act as
mediators to facilitate negotiated settlements).
35. Bernard, Empowering the Provider, supra note 34, at 339-40.
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mediation of PRRB cases had arrived and implemented a pilot mediation
project. 36 The in-house mediation program has been a major success,
from the perspective of both providers and government representatives.37
The advent of managed care emphasized negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration as preferred methods for resolving disputes between the
Medicare program, providers, and beneficiaries. Private sector, private
payor managed care organizations had led the way with varied success.
38
Medicaid managed care demonstration projects at the state level
experimented with ADR components. These experiments later informed
the choices that CMS made. a9 On both the federal and state levels,
legislators made ADR provisions boilerplate in almost every managed
care statute and other health reform statutes over the past ten years.4 ° We
must reserve some doubt, however, about the basis for these public
affirmations that ADR is appropriate in virtually all managed care
settings. Does this stem from a desire to make appeals processes rapid,
flexible, and truly user-friendly? Or is it tinged with a significant,
unacknowledged desire simply to save administrative costs and shift
responsibility?
36. See Kathleen Scully-Hayes, Mediation and Medicare Part A Provider Appeals: A
UsefulAlternative, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL. 356, 359 (2000) (describing the pilot mediation
project).
37. See id. at 362 (noting that participant feedback was overwhelmingly positive with
participants uniformly indicating their intention to use mediation in the future). One consultant
went so far as to say that the "[b]oard sponsored alternative dispute resolution process is the best
single idea that has been implemented, in terms of a party-neutral expedition of the PRRB
appeal process since the first hearing held on April 1, 1975." Id. at 363.
38. See, e.g., Ann H. Nevers, Consumer Managed Care Appeals: Are the Available
Procedural Protections Fundamentally Fair?, 33 J. HEALTH LAW 287 (2000) (reviewing
adjudicatory and ADR procedures in private payor HMOs and MCOs).
39. Professor Sidney Watson presents an intriguing class analysis of Medicaid HMOs and
other managed care plans, wherein she suggests "managed care, when done responsibly," offers
ways to "reconstruct" welfare medicine by focusing on "a long-term relationship with primary
care providers." Sidney D. Watson, Commercialization of Medicaid, 45 ST. Louis. L.J. 53, 7 1,
77 (2001). The CMS final rule publishing enrollment, quality assurance, grievance rights and
other procedures for Medicaid managed care entities offers insight into the complicated
dialogues between practitioners, providers, state agencies and beneficiaries with CMS and
identifies the positive and negative experiences to date. See generally Medicaid Program;
Medicaid Managed Care, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,989 (June 14, 2002).
40. A comprehensive survey of grievance procedures throughout the nation is found in
Joyce Krutick Craig, Managed Care Grievance Procedures: The Dilemma and the Cure, 21 J.
NAT'LASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGEs 336 (2001).
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B. Mediating in Private About Public Matters
1. The Theoretical Framework
The issues for discussion here illustrate in a tangible way the theoretical
concerns Professor Owen Fiss raises in his now-classic article Against
Settlement.4' His critique of institutionalized ADR may sound caustic.
"Consent is often coerced;... although dockets may be trimmed, justice may
not be done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions
of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised. 42 But it has the
ring of truth. For, unless the contending parties stand on roughly equal footing,
coercion is built into the very structure of society and the legal system. What
happens if both parties do not have access to the same resources?
Fiss explains that "disparities in resources between the parties can
influence the settlement in three ways. '43 All three reflect the power dynamics
of mediations between private parties and the Medicare program. In
considering the situation of beneficiaries mediating with health care providers
and with Medicare as payor, the influence of such disparities is amplified.
* "[T]he poorer party may be less able to amass and analyze the
information needed to predict the outcome of the litigation; and
thus be disadvantaged in the bargaining process."44 No provider
institution, individual provider, nor beneficiary has at their
disposal the arsenal of data concerning Medicare treatment and
payment practices and policies that CMS possesses. Furthermore,
the federal government holds immediate and, increasingly,
ultimate authority over the outcome by controlling not only the
adjudicators, but all principles used for decision-making.45
41. See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984)
(stating that settlement should not be "institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate
basis").
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1076.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. This theoretical issue has taken practical shape in recent months concerning Medicare
national coverage determinations. Last year CMS published a proposed rule that, inter alia,
would require administrative law judges (ALJs) to be bound by local medical review policies,
and to compel ALJs to comply with national coverage determinations (NCDs) that have been
based on clinical and scientific evidence. See CMS, Medicare Program: Review of National
Coverage Determination and Local Coverage Determinations, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,534, 54,538
(proposed Aug. 22, 2002) (proposing that NCDs be binding on ALJs and not allowing an AL
to disregard, set aside, or otherwise review an NCD). The proposed rule would remove their
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* "[The poorer party] may need the damages he seeks immediately
and thus be induced to settle as a way of accelerating payment,
even though he realizes he would get less now than he might ifhe
awaited judgment.",46 In 1984 Fiss wrote "simply" about the
fiscal exigencies pressuring a party who confronts on one side a
growing hill of debts (such as medical expenses) already incurred
because of the litigated incident, and on the other side, the loss of
regular income, again because of the underlying dispute.47
Today, in the context of Medicare fiscal disputes, both time
pressures and time value for their resolution have magnified
considerably. Here, by definition, most beneficiaries live on fixed
incomes that have little margin for unanticipated, unpaid medical
expenses. Even in situations that are not fee-for-service, both the
managed care organization and the patient must know promptly
whether Medicare will or will not cover a service, or risk
impairment of the patient's health by failing to provide the
service in a therapeutically efficacious time frame.
* "[The poorer party might be forced to settle because he does not
have the resources to finance the litigation, to cover either his
own projected expenses, such as his lawyer's time, or the
expenses his opponent can impose through the manipulation of
procedural mechanisms such as discovery. ,48 Most patients lack
the financial or emotional resources to support protracted
litigation over health care services or payment denials.
Furthermore, few advocates-attorney or non-attorney---can
undertake such representation on terms affordable for the bulk of
the elderly or disabled receiving Medicare benefits. Without a
reasonably knowledgeable and dogged advocate, it is unlikely
that most Medicare beneficiaries could successfully navigate the
discretion to conduct an independent review of the propriety of that determination on a case-by-
case basis. See id. at 54,537, 54,547 (determining that it is not appropriate for an AU to rewrite
coverage determinations). This has raised a storm of protest because federal judges have ruled
in favor of the beneficiaries and their providers in more than half the cases where ALJs denied
coverage. According to some reports in the popular press, the Bush administration intends to
present legislation replacing AU review with mediation or arbitration, in line with a
Connecticut demonstration project. See Robert Pear, Bush Pushes Plan to Curb Appeals in
Medicare Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, at Al (outlining legislation the Bush
administration may steer Medicare reviews toward ADR).
46. Fiss, supra note 41, at 1076 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
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confusing world of health care appeals. Yet, such patient
advocacy is rare.49
How does society rebalance such imbalances of power? Through the
courts. Fiss argues eloquently that: "Civil litigation is an institutional
arrangement for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our
chosen ideals."50 He sees adjudication "American-style" not as a "reflection of
our combativeness," but rather as "a tribute to our... commitment s, to equal
justice even when the parties are not economically, socially, or politically
equal.52
In this paradigm ofjustice, although recognizing that true equality may be
illusory, fairness requires adjudicatory processes so the playing field is tilted
less abusively. Legal scholars from perspectives as diverse as Professor
Richard Delgado53 to Professor Judith Resnik 4 have challenged the
institutionalization of ADR. Resnik has urged caution in the apparent rush to
make ADR the default setting for adjudication.5 That is to say, when the
courts fail to fulfill their promise ofjustice-due to crowded dockets and high
litigation costs-we should think carefully whether the system should divert
49. There is a call for change. As Professor Maxwell Mehlman argued, the patient needs
a true, uncompromised patient advocate who can "prevent the patient from being injured by the
denial of necessary services" as much as securing "redress after the injury has occurred."
Maxwell J. Mehiman, Medical Advocates: A Call for a New Profession, I WID. L. SYMp. J.
299,320 (1996). See also Bethany J. Spielman, Managed Care Regulation and the Physician-
Advocate, 47 DRAKE L. Rv. 713,719 (1999) (comparing Mehlman's expanded role of patient
advocate with the traditionally conceived role of the physician as patient advocate).
50. Fiss, supra note 41, at 1089.
51. Id. at 1090.
52. Indeed, as Professor Marilyn Denny cautions, the informal, internal dispute resolution
processes of managed care plans could create the "illusion of fair dealing" while diverting the
beneficiary (especially those who are poor or otherwise disadvantaged) into processes in which
"their rights are violated in the name of efficient justice." Marilyn Denny, Managed Care:
Increasing Inequality & Individualism, 3 QUNNWIAc HEALTH LJ. 59, 83 (1999/2000).
53. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 6 Wis. L. Rav. 1359-1404 (1985) (arguing that
ADR procedures may foster racial and ethnic prejudice and should be reserved for disputes in
which parties of comparable status and power confront each other).
54. See generally Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OH1O ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995) (arguing that ADR may
in fact narrow the forms of dispute resolution available to litigants instead of increasing such
options).
55. See id. at 262 (suggesting that injecting ADR into the adversarial process will
undermine the attributes that prompted praise for ADR).
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parties to ADR.56 This would assure some access to justice, but it may be
suboptimal.
On the other hand, Resnik notes that some parties might prefer ADR over
adjudication.57 For them, ADR would not constitute a mere "default" setting.
Rather, they may prefer the informality of ADR as a way to promote candid
communication and improved problem-solving. The very absence of
procedural and evidentiary rules found in the court room could equate to more,
not less, justice.5 8 Still, a wide disparity of resources between the parties (as
Fiss described) would undermine fairness. And clearly, there is no greater
disparity of resources than in a dispute between a private person and the federal
government.
When this Article turns to the issue of mediating with the federal
government, yet another foundational premise of ADR must be re-examined.
Private resolutions for disputes between private parties may suit a society that
privileges individualism and autonomy.59 However, the past generation of
administrative law reforms has struggled to bring transparency to government.
The watch word has been openness in government, not privacy or secrecy.
60
56. Id.
57. See id. at 243-52 (exploring the arguments supporting ADR over adjudication).
58. Id. at 252.
59. Consider how settlement may serve the needs of individuals by preserving their
privacy and ability to negotiate resolutions that save them from personal embarrassment. The
same settlement, however, may work against the larger interests of the organizations,
corporations, or social groups of which those parties are members. See Fiss, supra note 41, at
1078 (providing examples that show the conflict of interest between the individual interest of
the person given authority to settle on behalf of an organization and that organization's larger
interest).
60. This debate comes into sharpest focus around the question of confidentiality in
government ADR. See Mark M. Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act and Confidentiality
Under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 9 ADMiN. L.J. AM. U. 985, 986 (1996)
(examining the confidentiality and conflict between the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1990 (ADRA) and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and recommending legislation
that will give full effect to the confidentiality standards of the ADRA). This article predated the
thorny litigation commenced when, in an investigation of the possible misuse of public funds,
the Office of the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Agriculture sought access to
mediation records in a Texas farmer-lender mediation program sponsored by the agency. See In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d 487, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that although the
mediation statute required mediation sessions to be confidential, this did not necessarily mean
"privileged," and therefore the statute did not clearly manifest Congress's intent to prevent such
mediation sessions from being submitted to a grand jury). Since then, the senior ADR counsels
for cabinet agencies have developed guidelines attempting to balance the general expectation of
privacy in mediation with the need for public accountability. See Subcommittee of Federal
ADR Steering Committee, Confidentiality in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs,
65 Fed. Reg. 83,085, 83,086 (Dec. 29, 2000) (containing detailed guidance on the nature and
limits of confidentiality in Federal ADR programs).
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Thus, the very concept of privately mediated settlements fits uneasily with the
implementation of public policy and the payment of public funds.
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 (ADRA)6" attempted
to strike a workable balance. Congress based its enactment of this statute on a
finding that ADR was "faster, less expensive and less contentious" than
adjudication,62 and should be encouraged.63 Congress expressed its hope that
agencies would use ADR processes to develop more "creative, efficient and
sensible outcomes" 4 than would result from federal court litigation.
Nevertheless, Congress recognized that administrative justice sometimes
demands more formality, accountability, and openness.6 Agencies were
expected to develop guidelines for identifying those situations that would
benefit from the standard processes of litigation as compared to ADR.66 HHS
has led the way in implementing ADR. The past ten years have welcomed a
series of innovations that cut a path through the dense, troublesome issues
outlined here.
2. Medicare's Growing Experience with ADR
a. Building In-House Capacity
HHS proceeded incrementally, acting through the Departmental Appeals
Board (DAB).67 Throughout the 1980s, the DAB earned a strong reputation for
integrity and competence in handling a wide range of adjudications, especially
61. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 1 01-552, 104 Stat. 2736
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (2000)).
62. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552 § 2 (3), 104
Stat. 2736 (2000) (requiring agency employees presiding at hearings to inform the parties of
available ADR forums).
63. See id. §§ 2(1 H8), 104 Stat. at 2736 (noting the advantages of ADR over traditional
litigation and Congress's wish to encourage ADR processes); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 (1)(7),
573(c) (mandating that the President appoint an interagency commission to encourage the use of
ADR).
64. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552 § 2(4), 104 Stat.
2736 (2000); 5 U.S.C. § 571 (2000).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 572(b) (2000) (listing contra-indicators, which are factors that should
preclude ADR).
66. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-552, § 3, 104 Stat. 2736
(2000).
67. See Procedures of the Departmental Grant Appeals Board, 45 C.F.R. § 16 (2002)
("This part is designed to provide a fair, impartial, quick and flexible process for appeal from
written final decisions.").
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disputes over grants and medical research.68 The real and perceived
independence of the DAB, albeit located within the Office of the Secretary,
served a vital role in assuring the fairness of ADR.69 Namely, the public
utilizing ADR services-and, arguably, the legislators overseeing agency
activities-needed reassurance that settlements achieved behind closed doors
deserve the same level of respect accorded judgments rendered in a public
hearing room.7"
In August 1992, Secretary Louis Sullivan appointed John Settle of the
DAB as Dispute Resolution Specialist for all of HHS, pursuant to the Executive
Order No. 12,778 on Civil Justice, the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,
and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act. 7' All major components of HHS
designated senior officials to serve as liaisons to the Dispute Resolution
Specialist.72 In October 1992, HHS published an interim policy on ADR
within the Department which sought to rationalize current and proposed pilot
projects on ADR, while not stifling innovations.71 The interim policy explained
that this gigantic agency, with 118,000 employees located nationwide, has
"many differing functions... [and] wide variation in opportunities and
experience in ADR.0 4 The interim policy expressly embraced flexibility,
which would allow "a practical adaptation of mechanisms to program needs."
7 5
Earlier in 1992, the Department had put in place an Early Complaint
Resolution Process to resolve employment disputes among its own staff.
76
HHS began a "series of initiatives" to evaluate the effectiveness of ADR in the
labor-management arena.77 These initiatives included mediation and
negotiation of grievances, unfair labor practices, and labor-management
68. See 45 C.F.R. § 16.18 (2002). A positive description of DAB's ADR work is
contained in Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the Federal Government: Not Such
Strange Bedfellows AflerAll, 66 Mo. L. REV. 709, 720-21 (2001).
69. See Bernard, Empowering the Provider, supra note 34, at 342 (noting the perception
of the DAB as an independent arbiter of disputes even though it is part of HHS).
70. See id. at 289-95 (discussing in more detail concerns about HCFA control over PRRB
decision-making); id. at 341-43 (discussing in more detail DAB's potential role as an
independent arbiter in PRRB disputes because of its public legitimacy).
71. Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,616 (Oct. 27, 1992) (notice
of interim policy).
72. Id.
73. See id. (describing the goals of the interim ADR policy and stressing the "results
oriented approach" HHS was seeking).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 48,616-17.
77. See id. at 48,617 (observing that HHS had an experimental labor ADR program in
place and was preparing to examine it "using cooperative techniques").
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relations.78 Additional in-house ADR applications included using the "Total
Quality Management" program within the Department to expand internal ADR
initiatives, and the development of an internal ombudsman position for Social
Security Administration personnel.79
b. Mediation and Medical Services
Some observers have posited that negotiation and mediation should fit
readily into the language of health care professionals because the transactions
of daily work involve so much give-and-take. 0 Whether the issue is
developing medical treatment plans,8 1 communicating those directives to all
patient care staff,82 or negotiating rates of payment with payors,83 ADR
methods steer health care operations.8 4 If this thesis is correct, then it helps
illuminate the relatively rapid expansion of mediation at HHS. From the 1992
listing of a "potential pilot project in the exploratory stage, to use ADR in
disputes before the Provider Reimbursement Review Board in the Health Care
Financing Administration,"5 to implementation, took only six years.8 6
Another series of notices came during this period, erecting a regulatory
framework for rapid resolution of disputes among patients, providers,
physicians, and managed care organizations over denials or terminations of
treatment.87 These procedural changes sought to ameliorate the overwhelming
78. See id. (discussing a number of ongoing and proposed ADR efforts within HHS).
79. Id.
80. See generally LEONARD J. MARCUS ET AL., RENEGOTIATING HEALTH CARE: RESOLVING
CONFLICT TO BUILD COLLABORATION (1995).
81. See id. at 207 (placing the nurse at the center of this process, where negotiating is seen
as "their primary means of surviving on the job").
82. The authors urge that information exchange among a variety of health care
professionals rests at the heart of the medical enterprise and that the outcome of care depends
upon the quality of those communications. See id. at 48 (noting that patient care is a
collaborative effort that requires effective communication channels).
83. See id. at 196-197 (discussing the role of senior managers in conducting negotiations
with insurance companies over payment contracts).
84. Marcus's work offers the perspective of a composite health care administrator:
"Health reform demands that everyone in the system adjust to a new set of realities. If this
change process is to work, that adjustment must be part of an informed and collaborative
process." Id. at 191.
85. Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,616,48,617 (Oct. 27, 1992)
(notice of interim policy).
86. See Scully-Hayes, supra note 36, at 359-60 (noting that the Office of Hearings began
its pilot mediation project in 1998 with forty-eight cases).
87. See Establishment of an Expedited Review Process for Medicare Beneficiaries
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and unfair pressures of time-sensitive decision-making outlined in the previous
section of this Article.88 The cited issues of power dynamics, unequal
resources, and the exigencies of time pressures coalesced in 1993 in the form of
a federal class action, Grijalva v. Shalala.89
In Grialva, Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in risk-based managed care
organizations sued to assure that their rights be heard concerning quality of care
complaints, medical treatment decisions, and adequacy of information.9" Four
years later, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 91 which
included in Section 4001 a new Subpart C of the Medicare Program known as
the "Medicare+Choice Program" (M+C) embracing managed care plans.92 This
new statutory mandate required M+C organizations to provide "meaningful
procedures for hearing and resolving grievances between the organization...
and enrollees .... "9'
In December 2000, the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona approved the settlement agreement negotiated to resolve Grijalva and
to implement the mandates of the Balanced Budget Act.94 As the Department
described in the preamble to its final rule: "A key element of the agreement
was that CMS would propose to establish an independent review entity [IRE] to
conduct fast-track reviews of appeals of decisions to terminate services.""
Enrolled in Health Maintenance Organizations, Competitive Medical Plans, and Health Care
Prepayment Plans, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,368 (Apr. 30, 1997) (final rule with comment period) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R.) (publishing the appeal and grievance rights for Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in various medical plans). HCFA and CMS used the NAIC model grievance act as a
guide, but did not expressly set forth the ADR procedures established after Gryalva v. Shalala,
946 F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996). Changes to the grievance procedures based on program
experience and feedback from M+C organizations were published as a proposed rule at
Modifications to Managed Care Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,672, 65,685 (Oct. 25, 2002) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 409, 417 and 422).
88. See supra Part II.A. I (outlining time pressures).
89. Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996).
90. See id. at 749 (observing that the class action plaintiffs sued to force HHS "to
implement and enforce effective notice, hearing, and appeals procedures for HMO service
denials").
91. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, I11 Stat. 251 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
92. Id. at § 4001, 111 Stat. at 276 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 to
§ 1395w-28 (2000)).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(f) (2000).
94. Improvements to the Medicare+Choice Appeal and Grievance Procedure, 8 Fed. Reg.
16,652 (Apr. 4, 2003) (final rule with comment period) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422 and
489).
95. "Under the proposed process, M+C enrollees would receive detailed written notices
concerning their service terminations and their appeal rights at least four days before a service
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Beneficiaries having a grievance-any other complaint about service-would
have a different track.96 Grievances would go through ADR, with an emphasis
on negotiation, conciliation, and mediation. 97
Beneficiary advocacy groups primarily had demanded that CMS assure
safeguards would protect neutrality in the ADR intervention.98 Therefore,
CMS designated a neutral party for disputes concerning termination of services
by an MCO. 99 In this Article's proposal, the use of a trained third-party neutral
mitigates deeply embedded concerns about perceived conflicts of interest and
severe imbalances of power.
This Article now looks more deeply into the dynamics of ADR within
Medicare services. Specifically, whether the patient can find justice in forced
collaboration with the provider institution, physician, and Medicare program-
all of which still hold vastly superior power.
I1. Deconstructing the 800-Pound Gorilla
A. A Suitable Metaphor?
The 800-pound gorilla is a metaphor for a severe imbalance of power.
This iconic reference in contemporary society connotes a struggle: either a
potential adversarial relationship or one that has already manifested. Does the
metaphor truly fit mediation between the patient and provider concerning
Medicare services? Perhaps another contemporary insight deserves
consideration: Is there something broken that actually needs fixing? It seems
difficult to obtain a clear, unequivocal picture of beneficiary (namely, the
voting taxpayer) perceptions of Medicare. Are they satisfied with the services
received? Dissatisfied? In what proportions? To what degree? In which
service venues? And satisfied or dissatisfied compared to what alternatives?
termination." Id. at 16,652-16,653. The designated IRE for CMS is the Center for Health Care
Conflict Resolution.
96. See id. (explaining that "[a]ll other disputes are subject to the grievance requirements
under section 1862(0 of the Act").
97. See Improvements to the Medicare+Choice Appeal and Grievance Procedure, 66 Fed.
Reg. 7,593, 7,594 (Jan. 24, 2001) (notice of proposed rulemaking) (noting that grievance
procedures outside of fast-track review would be subject to standard procedures, including
ADR).
98. See id. (explaining that the federal class action was brought to preserve the rights of
enrollees when challenges to changes in their coverage were filed).
99. See id. (noting that the IRE "would be independent of any managed care organization,
or company affiliated within a managed care organization").
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Impressions range widely. CMS tracked the volume of cases in its appeals
processes and concluded that Medicare customer satisfaction in managed care
ranked on par with that of private payor MCOs. °° Some critics may not
consider this a ringing endorsement. Both the popular and scholarly press are
filled with assessments that consumers are dissatisfied with private payor
MCOs as well.' 0 Still, it could be that just as doomsday reports of Medicare's
fiscal woes could be overblown,'02 so might apprehensions concerning the
impact of managed care on the doctor-patient relationship.
Part Im of this Article approaches the use of ADR in Medicare managed
care as a proposed remedy to a specific systemic dysfunction. Deconstructing
100. CMS estimates that with approximately 11.8 million Medicare beneficiaries being
discharged from hospitals each year, approximately 1.8 million are M+C enrollees. Of these,
CMS further estimates that only 0. 1% to 0.2% (1,800 to 3,600) cases will be disputed. As CMS
reported in its recent rule publication, approximately 75% of MCOs reversed their initially
adverse determinations after appeal. CMS derived this figure from a General Accounting Office
1999 Report to the Special Committee on Aging, "Greater Oversight Needed to Protect
Beneficiaries' Rights." Improvements to the Medicare+Choice Appeal and Grievance
Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. 16,652, 16,664 (Apr. 4, 2003) (final rule with comment period) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422 and 489).
Professor Eleanor Kinney reviewed federal reports on Medicare grievance and appeals
procedures and found that there may be underreporting of"consumer concerns about coverage
denials, given that few coverage denials actually proceed to appealed lawsuits or even
reconsiderations." Eleanor D. Kinney, Tapping and Resolving Consumer Concerns About
Health Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 346 (2000).
101. There is clearly also some dissatisfaction with Medicare HMOs for reasons that could
be addressed in part through the proposal presented in this paper. High voluntary disenrollment
rates from HMOs need to be taken seriously. As presented by the GAO, "[a ]1992 study
reported that 48 percent of disenrollees from Medicare HMOs cited dissatisfaction as their
reason for leaving, [and] 23 percent cited a misunderstanding of HMO services or
procedures...." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS 98-142, MEDICARE: MANY
HMOs EXPERIENCE HIGH RATES OF BENEFICIARY DISENROLLMENT, REPORT TO THE SPECIAL
COMMITrEE ON AGING, U.S. SENATE 3-4 (1998). Of the 194 HMOs with Medicare risk
contracts in 1996-1997, covering at least 250 members for seven months, forty-one plans, or
one-fifth, had disenrollment rates of 20% or more. One Florida plan's rate was 71% of its
annual membership. Id. at 4.
Special concern exists over the quality, appropriateness and consumer satisfaction with
long-term care services. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-109
LONG-TERM CARE: CURRENT IssuEs AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, U.S. SENATE (1998) (providing an overview of the debate from
various perspectives, including HHS). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-HEHS-
94-140, LONG-TERM CARE: DEMOGRAPHY, DOLLARS, AND DISSATISFACTION DRIVE REFORM
(1994) (finding that despite billions of dollars spent, and despite high costs "disabled persons
are increasingly dissatisfied with available services and their ability to obtain them").
102. See Theodore R. Marmor & Gary J. McKissick, Medicare's Future: Fact, Fiction
and Folly, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 246 (2000) (noting that forecasts of the financial state of
Medicare are "all too often fear-mongering ... [that] distorts one's understanding of Medicare's
current problems . ").
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the power relationships inherent in mediations among a patient, the patient's
family, the medical care team, and the Medicare program as payor is not meant,
in and of itself, to imply that there has been bad practice in handling such
matters. Rather, this analysis merely searches for principles to shape ideas
about future best practices. As such, this Part is presented in the spirit and
tradition of continual quality improvement, attempting to further program
efforts to make Medicare appropriately innovative and responsive.
B. The Standard Paradigms of Power
1. Power Balance and Mediation
Most people would look at the Medicare program-with its vast powers of
financial and legal coercion-and see overwhelming power over a provider of
services and over a beneficiary of services. In the view of most program
participants, what Medicare wants, Medicare gets. Providers comply with the
Medicare decisions, if only because of the enforcement power of the federal
government, the Office of the Inspector General, and the FBI. This includes
the power to impose criminal sanctions. If only for ease of administration,
services for other patients, which are covered by other payors, often are
structured to be compatible with Medicare's requirements.
Under these circumstances, how can one assert that there is a balance of
power sufficient to recommend mediation between the payor and provider
concerning a dispute in payment or coverage? Mediation can work when the
providers are sophisticated, institutional entities with legal representation
present at the negotiations, principles of law are not central to resolving the
dispute, perceptions of facts are more important than the law, and personal
credibility and trustworthiness are essential to the use of a flexible approach in
resolving the dispute. With these factors in place, mediation of Part A disputes
has proved successful at the Provider Reimbursement Review Board.'0 3 But
can it work when the mediation involves the beneficiary?
Mediation is ideal for the "people problems" that present themselves
disguised as "legal problems." Thus, it can work well or is appropriate when:
103. A discussion of potential changes to the Medicare review process, developed in focus
groups of providers and provider representatives and in consultations with government
stakeholders, is found in Bernard, Empowering the Provider, supra note 34, at 334-42. See the
favorable review of the pilot project by a health law attorney representing providers in Thomas
H. Brock, PRRB Mediation Pilot Program Expedites Payment Dispute Resolution, HEALTHCARE
FIN. MGMT. Mar. 1, 1999 at 52.
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" The parties are not in a gross imbalance of power, such that any
agreement could not be considered the product of freely exercised
will. 1
04
* There is a prior, existing, or continuing relationship between the
parties; or, if there is no prior or likely future relationship, the
parties desire a good reputation in the community. 10
5
* There are few legal issues at stake and no precedent that needs to
be enunciated.'l°
" All persons necessary to effect and hold to a successful resolution
are present at the table. '
0 7
104. A classic such situation was presented in Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F.
Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999), in which an older woman of infirm health, operating under
great emotional stress, entered into a mediated agreement with a mortgage company that worked
seriously to her disadvantage. Id. at 1114. Because mediations occur in private, parties are
usually without a written record of the proceedings. Moreover, because disadvantaged parties
by definition will not likely have the resources to pursue a vigorous appeal of a coerced
agreement, proportionally few cases have reached the courts. Some scholars, following the lead
of Professor Fiss, have examined the issue, including Andre R. Imbrogno, Using ADR to
Address Issues of Public Concern: Can ADR Become an Instrument for Social Oppression?, 14
OH1o ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 855 (1999). Within that article, Imbrogno discusses domestic
violence as an example of "issues of general societal concern, involving historically
disadvantaged groups, that courts should be reluctant to channel into ADR." Id. at 878.
105. The relationship of the parties-indeed, that there is a relationship--embodies the
intangible but essential element of trust without which mediation cannot work. One contributor
to a symposium on whether environmental ADR is working in America cited this as an area
needing serious attention: "ADR not only depends on trust but is itself probably a contributor to
increasing or decreasing trust." J. Clarence Davies, Environmental ADR and Public
Participation, 34 VAL. U.L. REv. 389, 400 (2000). Congress has articulated a concern for
building trust through ADR. To create a more user (taxpayer) friendly system with a greater
"likelihood of achieving consensual resolution of disputes." Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 2(2), 104 Stat. 2736 (2000).
106. If the law is essential to justice in a case, then ADR is probably not appropriate. This
accords with ADRA, 5 U.S.C. § 572(b)()--(3), (5) (2000) (expressing a policy of adapting
formal procedures when precedent on procedural transparency is highly valued). Consider the
analysis in Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory ofAlternative
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1997), noting that the "law does not provide a basis
for substantive review of[ADR] results." Id. at 639.
107. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) is
probably the best-known case on the issue of compelling attendance by stakeholders with
settlement authority. In a mediation styled to include the clients in active, problem-solving
roles, personal attendance may merit a court order. On the other hand, where mediation is
conducted as a settlement conference between the attorneys, the personal input by the clients
matters less. See Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The
Lessons ofG. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059,1115 (1991)
(noting the importance of encouraging party participation in mediation meant to "facilitate and
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* All participants have available to them whatever is required to
make informed choices.'
08
" The mediation participants are ready and able to speak for
themselves, even if they must be assisted by persons the
participants have designated in advance. 109
" A pragmatic resolution will be acceptable, even if it does not
follow the technicalities of the law." 1
" The parties will voluntarily comply with the resolution." I
When Medicare mediations are framed in this light, one questions the
basic premise entirely. Is mediation of such issues appropriate at all when the
parties are not sophisticated institutional providers of care, but instead are
unsophisticated, typically unrepresented lay persons confronted by a denial of
care, reduction in treatment, refusal of coverage, or an experience of disrespect
or discord in the provision of medical care?
2. Power Imbalance and Medical Treatment
Some researchers studying the dynamics of conflicts concerning medical
practice have described the psychological context of these conflicts in ways that
educate"). Separately, ADRA recommends against ADR in government cases significantly
affecting the rights and interests of persons or organizations who are not parties to the
proceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 572(b)(4) (2000).
108. See supra Part II.B.I (discussing information available to the parties).
109. ADRA charges agencies with the responsibility to identify cases "so complex or
specialized" that parties need attorney representation or assistance. Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 10 1-552, § 9(a)(2), 104 Stat. 2746, 2747 (2000). It also
generally allows for party assistance in ADR, although not requiring those person to be lawyers.
Id. at § 9, 104 Stat. at 2747.
110. This is the corollary of 5 U.S.C. § 572(b)(3) (2000) (instructing agencies to forego
ADR where "maintaining established policies is of special importance...").
11I. Otherwise, the agency's continuing jurisdiction would be required under ADRA, 5
U.S.C. § 572(b)(6) (2000) (noting that ADR is inappropriate if the agency would have to
monitor the implementation of the agreement). The case would therefore not be appropriate for
ADR. Courts have taken a variety of stances concerning the enforceability of a mediated
agreement when a party attempts to repudiate it. Although voluntariness and self-determination
theoretically play a vital role in mediation, courts do not always honor their exercise. An
excellent case review on this topic is found in James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe,
Mediating in the Shadow ofthe Courts: A Survey ofthe Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. Ray.
171, 195-205 (2001) (discussing the practical reasons why courts have refused to enforce
mediated agreements).
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we should consider with regard to coverage issues."12 Although the system may
see this as a payor-payee or provider-beneficiary matter, for the individual
caught in the midst of it all, this is about a doctor-patient relationship that has
gone sour."13 It is about trust that either has been broken or had not been forged
from the beginning.' 
4
To understand the dynamics of the conflicts mediation seeks to resolve or
prevent, we must return to the generating circumstances. We must understand
the interrelationships of the stakeholders to understand the possibilities for
settlement beginning with the mind-set of the patient-beneficiary.
Clearly, when a person is ill enough to go to a doctor, he is experiencing
some level of physical discomfort. This physical issue also has psychological
and emotional dimensions, even if it is not what society would categorize as a
psychosomatic disorder. As one registered nurse and conflict resolution
specialist astutely described," 5 the patient typically enters the relationship with
a diminished self-image. 16 This is accompanied by a feeling that he is losing
control over his life," 17 which may be a reality. Hence, the patient experiences
112. See Chris Currie, Mediation and Medical Practice Disputes, 15 MEDIATION Q. 215,
217 (1998) (describing the mental state of a patient when seeking medical care).
113. See id. (noting that a patient approaches a doctor with preconceived notions of trust
that can be destroyed if the doctor gives improper or incomplete care).
114. Trust has been even harder to form and maintain under managed care systems. See
Eugene C. Grochowski, Ethical Issues in Managed Care: Can the Traditional Physician-
Patient Relationship Be Preserved in the Era of Managed Care, or Should it Be Replaced by a
Group Ethic?, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 619, 636 (1999) (arguing vigorously that the physician
has an affirmative "duty to create an atmosphere that will foster a trusting relationship"). Dr.
Grochowski offers an example of how trust affects services, explaining that trust "is therapeutic
(perhaps through a placebo effect)" and it relieves "anxiety." Id. A forty-year old man whose
brother died of a myocardial infarction visits his physician, demanding an expensive cardiac
stress test. Id. However, "what he really wants is to be reassured that he is healthy." Id. After
a series of less costly examinations, tests, laboratory procedures, and acid-inhibiting medication,
the physician determines that the man shows no troubling symptoms, despite his family history.
Id. Grochowski goes on to conclude:
If the physician and patient have a trusting relationship, then the patient will likely
accept the reassurance from his physician and drop his request for an exercise stress
test. However, if the patient perceives that the physician is a gatekeeper who
achieves a secondary financial gain through not recommending the expensive
exercise stress test, the patient may not be convinced that the exercise stress test is
unnecessary.
Id. at 636-37.
115. Currie, supra note 112, at 217.
116. Id.
117. See id. (describing the perception a patient maintains of his personal mental state
when seeking a physician).
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"considerable anxiety and insecurity.""18 These stresses may reveal themselves
in a heightened desperation to believe the "myth that Western medicine is
infallible,,"119 such that anything short of a complete cure violates trust." 0 Lack
of a perfect outcome therefore equals betrayal.
The physician also experiences the therapeutic relationship at a
psychological and emotional level. 2' When confronted with the complaint,
grievance, or general displeasure of a patient, his attitude evidences
defensiveness. 122 The patient's disapproval threatens the physician's self-image
as a healer.' 23 The sense that his work has not been appreciated feeds an
underlying anger, which may or may not be expressed. 24 Undeniably, the
doctor becomes increasingly tense.2 5 There is much resentment over the
"significant amounts of time taken from their practice to respond to what they
believe are frivolous claims."' 26  And, finally, there is frustration and
bewilderment, as he sincerely believes he has met his promises to his
patients.
127
It would be appropriate to extend the psychological and emotional context
of the physician to include the psychological and emotional context of the
provider organization. Although some do not believe that organizations have a
psyche or emotions, the expansion should include the MCO's representatives.
C. Toward a Paradigm of Empowerment More Than Power Balance
1. Power Goals Require Power Balance
When the goal of the mediation is to win, power begins, sustains, and ends
the analysis. What does winning entail? In regard to Medicare services, a
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. (noting that a patient perceives a lack of a total cure to be a violation of the
doctor's duty).
121. See id. (observing that a physician enters a relationship with a patient with pre-
existing attitudes and beliefs).
122. See id. (arguing that a patient's complaint can cause the doctor to suffer tension).
123. See id. (relating the physician's self-perceived role as an authority on medical issues).
124. See id. (describing the sense of annoyance physicians feel when faced with patient
complaints).
125. See id. (analyzing the physician's animosity to patient claims).
126. Id.
127. See id. (observing that a physician generally posits that a patient was given the most
effective cure possible).
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"win" for a patient might mean achieving authorization for, and payment of,
services which had been denied. Or the physician might have "won" when the
IRE or CMS has confirmed her medical judgment. Even ostensibly fiscal
disputes carry an emotional content. For example, a determination in favor of
coverage relieves beneficiaries of financial burdens that have been weighing on
them and their credit history. A favorable monetary outcome, therefore,
improves the overall situation for the patient, the provider, and the physician.
Yet all participants probably have nonmonetary issues that cannot be addressed
through the processes of administrative or civil litigation.
In disputes better described as "people problems" as opposed to "legal
problems," the proper goals of mediation shift. The need to win recedes and is
replaced by a need to understand. When this occurs, a facilitative model of
mediation, designed to make communication between participants clearer and
more meaningful, can restore relationships to support the therapeutic mission.
Power matters most in cases in which the objective is for one party simply
to compel the other party to do its will, or in which a party effects its will by
exerting whatever nonviolent force is available. Under such circumstances, the
critiques launched by ADR theorists are justified. The ADR theorists have cast
serious doubt upon the widespread practice of mandatory referral to mediation
for civil cases that suffer from severe imbalances of power. Examples of such
imbalances include:
the unrepresented tenant with only a marginal education and no
other housing options versus the landlord, and
2
1
128. This is the prototypical case from small claims courts nationwide, in which "parties
unwittingly forfeit their legal protections and acquiesce to the demands of the powerful." Joel
Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest and
Rights Focused Model ofLandlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. DisP. RESOL. 53,54 (1997). The
authors, although critiquing this position, note that the traditional view argues that tenants
"leave a mediation feeling satisfied ... only because they are unaware of what they have
conceded." Id. The director of clinical programs at New England School of Law has closely
examined the housing courts, small claims courts, and bankruptcy matters handled through
mediation in Boston. Russell Engler, And Justice For All-Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987 (1999).
He urges "a fundamental re-examination ... of the roles of judges, mediators, and clerks in
cases involving unrepresented litigants." Id. at 1988. He contends that our rules barring
assistance by mediators or clerks stem from a false assumption that people willingly choose to
appear in court without counsel. See id. (noting that the unrepresented plaintiff is considered an
aberration. As a result, he argues that some degree of guidance or legal advice is essential to
ensure a represented or otherwise legally sophisticated party does not take "unfair advantage
over the unrepresented party." Id. at 2033.
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* the divorcing, unrepresented, formerly stay-at-home-wife and
mother versus the savvy businessman-husband and father. 129
But these critiques turn on a delicate axis that often goes unexamined.
Were these cases in which the only meaningful outcome was monetary? Or,
were these cases with relational factors that mattered equally, or even more than
money? Were there mechanisms in place to channel the primarily monetary
issues to a more adjudicatory setting for an impartial third party to review and
decide while face-to-face mediation dealt with the relational (people) problems?
Did the party with substantially less power have access and time to obtain the
information needed to make knowing and voluntary decisions? Particularly,
did the party with less power have an advocate to assist in clarifying
communications, protecting against coercive tactics, and lending emotional
support? The mediation diversions theorists criticize do not deal appropriately
with these issues of system design. What is proposed in Part IV of this Article
properly considers these concerns.
2. Relational Goals Require Empowerment
During the past twenty years, lawyers have come to recognize the potential
value of restoring harmony to relationships. The very words sound antithetical
to the role of the barrister-litigator; indeed they might be. On the other hand,
settlements reached in negotiation or mediation resolve most legal work in
America, including civil litigation. Presumably "hard-nosed" corporations,
insurers, and their legal counsel have grown to appreciate the dollar value of
listening and tendering an apology.130 In the health care industry, studies have
shown that an overwhelming majority of medical malpractice claimants file suit
129. This case is a composite of the central paradigm attacked as inappropriate for
mediation in several pioneering works. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (arguing that mediation does not embrace a
woman's relational position and life experiences); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly:
Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BuFF. L. REV. 441 (1992) (discussing
mediation's tendency to place women in inferior bargaining positions, thereby disempowering
them). The answer may be found in Penelope E. Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The
Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177 (1994) (arguing that lawyers should
participate actively in negotiated settlement conferences or mediation on behalf of their clients
in order to rebalance power and protect their client's interests in ways the mediator ethically
cannot); Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches
to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317 (1995) (same).
130. A broader discussion of this insight is found in John Lande, Failing Faith in
Litigation? A Survey ofBusiness Lawyers'and Executives'Opinions, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV.
1 (1998) (discussing survey results indicating that executives and in-house counsel are looking
more favorably on ADR as compared to litigation).
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not for a monetary remedy but instead as leverage to obtain a relational
remedy. 13' They want respect, an explanation for what happened, an apology,
and an assurance it will not happen again to someone else.'
32
Chris Currie offered a useful description of the relational goals a patient
seeks when he files a complaint or grievance against his managed care
organization or physician. 33 The patient wants:
" answers to questions he feels the physician or provider institution,
or both, have not been willing to answer honestly;
* recognition from the physician or provider institution, or both,
that his condition is serious and his condition has long-term, life-
changing consequences;
" to vent his anger over a poor doctor-patient or MCO-enrollee
relationship in which he felt ignored, neglected, or mistreated; and
" to hold the physician or the MCO, or both, accountable in order to
prevent the same situation from recurring with another patient.1
34
The goals described above embody what a transformative approach to
mediation describes as "empowerment."' 35 As defined by Robert Baruch Bush
and Joseph D. Folger, the founders of this approach to conflict resolution,
empowerment with regard to goals occurs "when a party reaches a clearer
realization, compared to before, of what matters to her and why, together with a
realization that it's important and deserves consideration."' 36  The
transformative model frames party power in personal terms, as a matter of
personal (not necessarily material) power. 137 This can manifest in the ability of
131. As a medical reviewer summarized: "[P]oor physician communication is the most
important factor influencing a patient to file a lawsuit against his physician." Zeev E. Neuwirth,
Physician Empathy-Should We Care?, 350 THE LANCET 606, 606 (1997).
132. See Currie, supra note 112, at 217-18 (discussing the result a patient hopes to attain
through mediation); see also Scott Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful
ofMediation Can Alleviate the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 907, 922-25 (1999) (documenting two empirical studies that indicate that
mediation can be an effective forum for resolution of medical disputes).
133. See Currie, supra note 112, at 217-18 (noting the four personal elements a patient
seeks in a solution to a medical claim).
134. See id. (describing the needs of parties).
135. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH D. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOwERMENT AND RECOGNITION 87 (1994) (describing,
among other things, elements necessary for empowerment of participants in ADR).
136. Id. at 96.
137. See id. at 87 (describing empowerment as a personal conception related to an
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parties "to clarify their views-to know what they want and do not want, to
stand up for those views, [and] what resources they have to address the
situation.... "" Given this subjective, self-referencing understanding of
power, Bush and Folger posit that no one is wholly without power.139 Everyone
has the potential to acknowledge and exercise his or her own personal power in
a mediation. 4° Indeed, this becomes one of the most important aspects of a
mediation.
1 41
A transformative mediation "succeeds" when there is empowerment.'
42
This occurs when "a party experiences a greater sense of self-worth, security,
self-determination, and autonomy."'143  Clearly, the transformative model
overlays well with the concept of mediation to heal a troubled doctor-patient
relationship. However, one must ask whether these goals are sufficient when
the patient or beneficiary confronts institutional power.
3. Sharing Power Between the Physician and Patient
It is important that any system for ADR present opportunities for party
empowerment. But it is equally important that the parties be fully informed and
make knowledgeable choices in the exercise of their autonomy. The physician
can serve as the single most valuable information resource for the patient. The
challenge is designing reliable, replicable methods to facilitate that sharing of
information and power in a nonthreatening way that is sensitive to emotional
cues. Some physicians, most notably Dr. Howard Brody, have engaged in
courageous self-examination useful to our analysis.
We begin here not with Brody's initial, foundational premises (which form
the basis of Part IV), but with his discussion of the patient's sense of
powerlessness that often accompanies illness.'"4 Brody sees this as a critical
element in the therapeutic relationship to which the physician must respond.'
41
individual's emotional development).
138. Id. at 198.
139. "[E]mpowerment is an objective that can be achieved in all cases .... " Id. at 94.
140. "if a party has taken the opportunity to collect herself, examine options, deliberate,
and decide on a course of action, empowerment has occurred, regardless of the outcome." Id. at
87.
141. See id. (noting that empowerment should be a goal in mediation regardless of the
outcome of the process).
142. See id. at 89 (discussing the features of successful ADR within the empowerment
process).
143. Id.
144. See HOWARD BRODY, THE HEALER'S PowER 64 n. 1 I (1992) (noting that a physician
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The first step the healer can take toward empowering the patient is to
share knowledge. 146 The physician has a near-monopoly over medical skills
and knowledge that can be used unilaterally (in an abuse of power) or
bilaterally (in a sharing of power).147 The patient may express preferences
concerning how much he cares to know, thus limiting the scope of
information revealed. 48 Brody suggests that the general rule, however,
should be to err on the side of more rather than less education about the
"nature of the disease and the treatment." 49
An expanded scope of information-sharing includes discussing
specific psychological aspects of the illness. Sharing power includes
identifying those issues with the patient, and then collaborating on the
management and treatment plan, just as would happen with technical
aspects of healing.
One of the continuing psychological dynamics will be the patient's
sense of loss of control. Whether as a placebo effect or not, Brody
perceives the patient's personal power as essential for treatment.150 Thus,
from time to time, the physician (or medical team) will need to remind the
patient "explicitly" that the patient still possesses power, which could be
realized by accessing additional social or human resources."15
Finally, because society has invested the physician with greater social
power compared to the patient, especially in a controlled, managed care
setting, additional, explicit reassurances may be necessary. The patient
needs to know that the physician is using all these social powers and skills
solely to secure "a positive therapeutic outcome" for the patient.' 52
often forgets that a patient retains some power while seriously ill).
145. See id. at 64-65 (observing how power in the physician-patient relationship can be
used ethically).
146. See id. at 65 ("The physician should try whenever practicable to share her Aesculapian
power by informing the patient ... about the nature of the disease and the treatment.").
147. Brody endorses shared power as a way to make the patient less vulnerable than when
the physician "has a power monopoly." When power is shared, the physician is "less tempted to
abuse his power." Secondly, the patient is more likely to "call [the physician] to account" and
the physician is more likely to reflect on how he uses power before invoking it. Id. at 61.
148. See id. at 65 (observing that a physician should respect a patient's desire to know or




152. Id. One must note, however, that a physician's actual power in a MCO typically falls
far short of the fee-for-service setting, and perhaps short of the patient's perception of the
physician's power. The OIG found many physicians reported concerns with Medicare HMOs,
including dissatisfaction with the HMO referral process (42% of physicians in the study) and
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Although it may be self-evident to the healer, it is not always so to the
patient, especially in a managed care environment which has attenuated the
doctor-patient link. 153 Indeed, if facilitated discussions between physician
and patient achieve only this-a common recognition that both seek the
same objectives-it may be sufficient. However, such credibility can likely
only be achieved through the use of a highly trained third-party neutral
person, with no perceived conflicts of interest.
D. The Empowerment Paradigm: Timing May Be Everything
The paradigm of empowerment described in this Part has the potential
to deal adequately and fairly with relational and communication conflicts in
medical treatment. Its real potential for quality improvement becomes
evident when applying this approach before a specific grievance or
complaint has manifested. The foundation of genuine power-sharing as
Brody describes it is that the physician and patient would be in full accord
concerning the patient's "life plan," "definition of the presenting problem,"
and what constitutes "excellence and quality in the practice of medicine."'
54
The overarching goal, particularly in primary care, is for the physician-
patient relationship to be "a primary therapeutic tool." This impressive
goal could be realized through the mediation model discussed in Part IV.
restriction of clinical independence (62%), leading them to believe fee-for-service is better for
access to specialists (72%) and for new treatments (69%). Physicians in this study also disliked
how their internal HMO complaints were handled (40%). Interestingly, 29% thought referral
restrictions for Medicare patients were worse than for all HMOs in general. U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OEI-02-97-00070,
PHYSICIAN PERSPECTIVES OF MEDICARE HMOs, at ii (1998).
153. This can be characterized, in part, as a fee-for-service versus managed care matter.
Companion articles in the Journal of the American Medical Association, cited by Grochowski,
present arguments that patients with the freedom to choose will actively seek out a physician
whom they trust, and select their provider on the basis of trustworthiness. See Alan L. Hillman,
Mediators of Patient Trust, 280 JAMA 1703, 1704 (1998) (presenting arguments that patients
with the freedom to choose the method of physician payment will actively seek out a physician
whom they trust, and select their provider on the basis of trustworthiness); Audrey C. Kao et al.,
The Relationship Between Method ofPhysician Payment and Patient Trust, 280 JAMA 1708,
1710 (1998) (same); see also Grochowski, supra note 114, at 629, 636 n.49 (citing the Hillman
and Kao articles and concurring that such communication as part of the physician's duty to
respect the patient's autonomy). "[V]eracity, confidentiality, and informed consent" lead to the
logical outgrowth: "that patients should be treated as partners and that physicians and patients
ought to share medical decision-making." Id. at 629.
154. BRODY, supra note 144, at 64.
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IV. The Mediated Medical Treatment Plan as a Model for
Empowerment
A. Reconciling a False Dilemma
Most Medicare beneficiaries can recall a time when they had a private
physician who had treated them for at least a decade, probably longer. The
physician knew the patient as more than a set of physiological disorders and
quirks. Their knowledge of each other extended beyond the skewed, artificial
setting of the examining room to a network of frequent social interactions in the
larger community. In the days before case management, when health care was
a profession not an industry, the doctor's visit centered on personal discussions
about the patient's life plan, the patient's definition of the presenting problem,
and how the physician could work with the patient to improve the latter in line
with the former.
The above description fits a nostalgic world often unfamiliar to managed
care settings.15 5 Increasingly, the doctor-patient relationship is episodic. To the
extent a patient finds continuity of care, that care vests in a multiperson medical
team whom the patient has probably never met except on an "as needed" or
"need to know" basis. There may or may not be a coherent plan for treatment.
If one exists, the plan has a short horizon, going from crisis episode to crisis
episode. 156 The plan is developed without substantial, direct input by the
patient and the patient's key family members. The medical team may not have
communicated the overall plan to the patient and the patient's family. If such
communications did occur, because of the timing-a crisis or hospitalization-
and the high stress of the medical event, the patient's comprehension probably
suffered.
The result? Frustration of good will on all sides, communications which
fail to connect, exacerbated insecurities, and, ultimately, the stage is set for a
complaint, grievance or appeal when the patient's medical condition changes
yet again. Managed care need not present a false dilemma of either having a
155. The American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs has
recommended that physicians should "reorient themselves 'toward the importance of having
effective discussions with patients about their preferences,"' so that the planning of end-of-life
decisions is "much more tightly woven into the fabric of the physician-patient relationship than
it has been previously." Kathy L. Cerminara, Eliciting Patient Preferences in Today's Health
Care System, 4 PSYCH. PUB. POL. L. 688, 689-90 (Sept. 1998).
156. See Grochowski, supra note 114, at 621-22 (finding decisions about treatment
coverage, and cost are made at the hospital bedside ("bedside rationing"), in a way "not
compatible with patient centered duties").
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well-rounded doctor-patient relationship or having available an array of
sophisticated medical technology at affordable rates. They can go together.
1. The Donald W Reynolds Department of Geriatric Medicine Model
The Donald W. Reynolds Department of Geriatric Medicine at the
University of Oklahoma College of Medicine in Oklahoma City has
demonstrated one way to join the two concepts. This innovative department
brings together internists, family practitioners, nurse practitioners, nurses,
clinical social workers, doctors of pharmacy, nutritionists, and psychologists to
offer a full spectrum of patient services. For the frail elderly, physical and
occupational therapists join the interdisciplinary team. The program focuses on
wellness, emphasizing in its training of medical students and residents that old
age is not a disease. 57 This basic assumption of patient competency and
personal power undergirds and reinforces the guiding principle that the doctor-
patient relationship should be, itself, "a primary therapeutic tool," as Brody
described.
The initial patient visit consists not only of a full medical assessment, but
also a self-assessment designed to convey the patient's life plan. How
comfortably is the patient meeting the activities of daily living? Is it optimal?
What would improvement look like from the patient's point of view? The
department's comprehensive geriatric assessment seeks to understand the
patient's perspective and also the views of the patient's family caregiver.
Often, a patient will have a family member or close friend who
accompanies them on medical visits. This could be a spouse, adult child, or
neighbor. Regardless of the relationship to the patient, this caregiver serves
informally as the patient's assistant in decision-making. They may also play the
behind-the-scenes role of assuring compliance with treatment decisions, such as
obtaining prescriptions, taking medication on time, and interfacing with social
service organizations. If the patient's level of competency has diminished, this
157. The University of Oklahoma's program is one of only five geriatrics departments in
allopathic medical schools in the nation. Under the leadership of Dr. Marie A. Bernard, this
department pioneered the teaching of geriatrics for all medical students with an emphasis on
community-based elders. By partnering medical students with healthy, non-hospitalized elder
"mentors," doctors-in-training learn by experience to understand the special abilities and
challenges of this patient population. Data demonstrate that the program has had a major,
positive impact on attitudes of medical students toward geriatric patients, compared to those
whose only clinical experience with the elderly has been the acute, often catastrophic events
necessitating hospitalization. See generally Marie A. Bernard et al., An Evaluation of a Low-
Intensity Intervention to Introduce Medical Students to Healthy Older People, 51 J. AMER.
GERIATRICS Soc. 419 (2003).
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caregiver becomes his de facto advocate and representative, even without
formal guardianship or medical power of attorney.
The department assigns an interdisciplinary team to each patient. This
team develops a treatment plan that goes beyond technical medical services to
address social and mental health needs. In close consultation with the patient
and his caregiver, the department develops guidelines to handle anticipated
emergency or other acute care requiring hospitalization. Wishes concerning
long-term care options and personal preferences for financial and physical
autonomy all contribute to the cycle of discussions.
2. The Mediated Treatment Plan
The Reynolds Department of Geriatric Medicine approach offers an
excellent, already established and proven model to build upon. The suggested
modification is to add trained comediators to the meetings between the patient,
the patient's caregiver, and the interdisciplinary team as the treatment plan is
reviewed and finalized. What purpose would mediators serve?
Even in a predispute setting, the participants may need expert facilitation
to assure effective communication. Each stakeholder at the table brings an
important and different viewpoint. The professional cultures from which they
proceed differ, although they may overlap in synergistic ways. This is the
strength of the multidisciplinary methodology, coupled with participation by
the patient and the patient's family. This also presents a potentially serious
barrier to successful communication. Add to this a much-needed diversity in
demographics (age, ethnicity, gender, religious tradition, geographic region,
class) and the odds increase that parties will talk past each other, never realizing
they have not had a meeting of the minds.5 8
In the comprehensive geriatric assessment (CGA), the patient completes a
"values history." Among other things, this elucidates the patient's preferences
concerning end-of-life options, antibiotics, transfusions, dialysis, respirators,
feeding tubes, and other "potentially harmful diagnostic and therapeutic
158. The reader should note that the suggestions presented here do not stem from
demonstrated, systemic problems to date. Rather, the proposed modifications attempt to take an
approach that has already worked well and, in the spirit of continual quality improvement, make
it even better. For purposes of this proposal, "better" means applying ADR at a time and in a
manner likely to empower the patient and cement a positive relationship with the
physician/medical team; rather than limiting the use of ADR to postgrievance or postcomplaint
mediation where power imbalances argue against fairness and where ADR is unlikely to
advance a therapeutic relationship.
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interventions."' 59 It is an important step forward in preserving patient dignity.
Still, for most people, values discussions rank among the most hazardous. The
values themselves may have gone unexamined for a long time. Confronting
them, especially in the presence of and in participation with others, can feel
threatening. The unsettling nature of"values talk"' 6 implicates all participants,
both the patient and health care professionals.'
6 1
When studying the process of group communication, authors have
observed that sometimes civility, collegiality, and a general desire to please can
result in less empowerment rather than more. 62 The person who tends toward
159. AMERICAN GERIATRICS SOCIETY, COMPREHENSIVE GERIATRIC ASSESSMENT POSITION
STATEMENT, at http://www.americangeriatrics.org/products/positionpapers/cga.shtml (last
updated Jan. 1, 1993, currently under revision). The interdisciplinary approach routinely used
by the Donald W. Reynolds Department of Geriatric Medicine implements the CGA endorsed
by the American Geriatric Society as being "critical in providing appropriate health care." Id.
The Position Statement notes that although the CGA is routine for older patients in long-term
care facilities in Great Britain, its use in America is limited to some academic centers and
Veterans Administration hospitals. Jd.
160. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 102-06 (1996) (adopting the term "values talk" in analyzing the process
of moral dialogues).
161. See Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Mediating Disputes in Managed Care: Resolving
Conflicts over Covered Services, 5 J. HEALTH CARE. L. & POL'Y 479, 479 n. *, 486-87 (2002)
(offering a number of illustrative examples from the national study "Strengthening the Patient-
Provider Relationship in a Changing Health Care Environment," funded by the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation). One study describes a conflict between the hospital neurologist, the
primary care physician the MCO assigned, and the patient's family concerning delayed
treatment following what arguably was a stroke. Could the patient be provided care in a
residential rehabilitation facility, or could she be provided care in her home? As Nancy Dubler
describes:
The level of calumny and conflict was high. The plan physician accused the
neurologist of shilling for the financial interests of the hospital and its financially
linked rehabilitation facility and ofmisunderstanding the range of safe and effective
home services. The hospital physician accused the plan of balancing its books by
short-changing its patients and denying them necessary services. According to the
neurologist, he told the plan physician, in front of the family, that "she should be
ashamed of herself."
This conflict was loud and disruptive .... There were manifest parties (the
physician) and latent parties (the administration of the hospital and the plan)
parties. Yet in the end, it was these latent parties that assisted in finding a
resolution. The visible players gathered around the hospital bed, providing a ready
forum, but were "dug into" their positions with little sense of how to move the
discussion and engage in useful information exchange. Clashing personalities did
not necessarily elucidate the perspectives and interests of patient, family, hospital
and community plan [MCO]. The voice of the patient was somewhat lost in the
din.
Id. at 486-87.
162. See, e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN
1452
MEDIATING WITH AN 800-POUND GORILLA
introversion, or who simply processes and speaks at a slower pace than others
may find their contributions stifled. Doubts or concerns may go unspoken in an
effort to "not be a troublemaker," only to flare up months later. 63
Skilled facilitators serve the function of keeping things civil and free of
bitter conflict by, paradoxically, giving people a voice to express dissent and to
engage, if needed, in productive conflict. Please note that the word "conflict" is
used here in its generic denotation, referring to the expression of diverse
viewpoints.' 64 This clash of ideas is not the same as an entrenched struggle of
wills. It is democracy in action; it is a lively discussion between equals, in
which everyone at the table is empowered.
Mediators adhering to a Code of Professional Conduct, such as that of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court for its court-connected program (known as Early
Settlement), 6 ' would moderate the pace of discussions to assure the patient has
CONVERSATION 224-27 (2001) (discussing the linguistic ambiguity of communications between
men and women). For example, consider how society often views indirectness differently. In a
man, this linguistic strategy typically would be characterized as "politeness" in a man. The same
communication style in a woman would connote instead that she is merely "powerless." Id. at
224-27. Tannen finds this two-edged interpretation applies equally well in analyzing dialogues
among persons from different ethnic backgrounds. For example, the minority person's own
preferences might be signaled by asking a question about the other person's desires, rather than
stating directly and unequivocally (in standard European-American fashion) what they wish to
have happen. Id. at 226-27.
163. See PHYLLIS BECK KRITEK, NEGOTIATING AT AN UNEVEN TABLE: A PRACTICAL
APPROACH TO WORKING WITH DIFFERENCE AND DIVERSITY 35 (1994) (describing the importance
of equality in negotiation settings). One aspect of the "uneven table" is described as:
[S]eating people who have historically never been there, and then expecting them
to successfully negotiate on their own behalf despite the sizable gap in skills,
experience, and cultural training between such new participants and those who have
been there for some time. In addition, in this situation, the fact that the mores,
customs, and values of the group who have been there for some time will prevail is
ignored, and the new participant is expected to adapt rather than change these
mores, custom, and values. Indeed the new player is considered a "problem" if this
adaptation does not occur.
Id. This description, developed by a health care practitioner with substantial conflict resolution
experience, offers an excellent description of the slanted dialogues which the Reynolds
Department of Geriatric Medicine endeavors to avoid, by welcoming the addition of mediators
to assure an even table without fail.
164. The primary definition of "conflict" in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1981) reads: a "clash, competition, or mutual interference of opposing or
incompatible forces or qualities (as ideas, interests, wills)."
165. Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators, Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12, ch. 37, app. A
at 485 (West 1993). The Code of Conduct states:
Mediation is an informal process for resolving a dispute with the assistance of a
mediator [defined in A. 1 as: "an impartial third party certified according to the
provisions of the [Oklahoma Dispute Resolution Act] who enters a dispute with the
consent of the parties, to aid and assist them in reaching a mutually satisfactory
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at hand the knowledge required to make an informed choice about the matters
under review. This could require a recess or reconvening the mediation to
obtain additional information. The critical point would be to assure all
participants reached voluntary, knowledgeable consensus before the treatment
plan was finalized. The Early Settlement model trains mediators to look for
verbal and nonverbal cues that suggest emotional problems that need further
exploration. Using specific communication techniques, they seek out
underlying concerns and aspirations to assure full understanding and
voluntariness in decision-making.
Informed consent in a managed care environment has come under scrutiny
lately. Some observers ask, dubiously, whether there can be informed consent
as the standard developed in traditional fee-for-service medicine, when the
MCO undoubtedly discourages informing enrollees about higher-cost
options.166 This concern may have merit.
However, it seems more likely that Medicare enrollees are not clamoring
for more expensive, more intensive tertiary care. Rather, they seek a better
quality of interaction with the human beings who provide hands-on care.
1 67
They want someone to listen respectfully to their concerns. If treatments are
necessary, they want to limit any time spent in an acute care setting. They seek
ways to retain their own home and their dignity for the maximum time.
These are likely the patients' underlying interests, whether articulated fully
or not. Mediators trained under a facilitative model, such as the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's Early Settlement Program, endeavor to bring these interests to
the surface. They frame and reframe discussions around these all-important
principles. Invasive, high-intensity procedures may seem to be the symbol of
settlement to the issues in dispute"] .... Those who act as mediators must be
dedicated to the principle that all disputants have a right to negotiate and attempt to
determine the outcomes of their own conflicts.
id.
The Code of Conduct requires the mediator to suspend or terminate the mediation:
(1) "when it appears that continuation would harm or prejudice any party"; (2) "when it appears
that a party is unable or unwilling to make an effort to meaningfully participate in the mediation
process;" or (3) "when it appears that mediation is not productive, and the parties are unwilling
to continue." Id. at 486. Early Settlement mediators are trained according to a standardized
protocol. If one party insists upon using the process to intimidate the other party, the mediator
is instructed to call the session to a halt and to refuse to proceed. See ADRS Basic Training
Manual, §§ 9-40, 9-41 (defining "impasse").
166. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 32, at 138 ("Under managed care, the
coverage/treatment decision is made, in the first instance, by individual doctors and managed
care organizations who are subject to direct financial incentives to deny care.").
167. See supra Part 1.B (describing the patients' desire to develop more meaningful
relationships with caregivers).
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Western medicine at its best and therefore this represents the measure of high
quality care. On the other hand, a patient whose most deeply held values are
autonomy and dignity might not be willing to agree to large amounts of tertiary
care. 168
Trade-offs may be unavoidable. Knowing this in advance, and working
through it collaboratively, can avoid the destructive confrontations between
families and providers that can occur in a medical crisis. Using a trained third-
party neutral to facilitate these predispute discussions may be "essential to
ensuring integrity in decision-making" as consumer advocates urged in
reference to HMO complaint processes.' 69
B. Merging Idealism and Pragmatism
1. Toward a Synergy of Public Resources
To the jaded, the concept of sharing power to enhance the efficacy of
medical treatment may seem hopelessly idealistic. On the other hand, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services-not known as a "soft touch"-has
opened the door to experimentation along these lines. 7
In Oklahoma, discussions are underway to explore how mediators from
the Early Settlement program might facilitate the development of medical
treatment plans within the Reynolds Department of Geriatric Medicine.
168. See C. Patterson & C. Rosenthal, Living a Little More Dangerously, 350 THE LANcET
1164, 1164 (Oct. 18, 1997) ("Risks perceived by individuals often differ substantially from the
perceptions of 'experts."'). Such decision-making presents a complex, subtle interplay of
personal and societal values. The goal sought is genuine, knowledgeable and fully developed
informed consent. The theoretical principles are self-determination and shared power. The
operational question is risk assessment from the patient's point of view. One geriatrics
department framed it succinctly: "How do old people view risk? Would most wish to enjoy life
more, or perhaps for fewer years?" Id. These writers note: "Risks perceived by individuals
often differ substantially from the perceptions of 'experts."' Id.
169. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-T-HEHS-98, HMO COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS:
PLANS' SYSTEMS HAVE MOST KEY ELEMENTS, BUT CONSUMER CONCERNS REMAIN 4 (1998).
170. For example, three CMS solicitations of proposals in 2002 could fit within the model
suggested here: (i) Solicitation for Proposals for the Demonstration Project for Disease
Management for Severely Chronically III Medicare Beneficiaries with Congestive Heart Failure,
Diabetes, and Coronary Heart Disease, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,267 (Feb. 22, 2002); (2) Solicitation for
Proposals for Medicare Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) Demonstrations in the
Medicare+Choice Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,209 (Apr. 15, 2002); and (3) Solicitation for
Proposals for the Physician Group Practice Demonstration, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,116 (Sept. 27,
2002). CMS has published an interim final rule with comment period updating authorization
for "Programs of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE)," 67 Fed. Reg. 61,496 (Oct. 1,
2002) which could also embrace an approach such as that suggested here.
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Several years ago, under a Hewlett Foundation grant, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court trained a cadre of Early Settlement mediators in the
advanced skills required for adult guardianship cases.' 7' These mediators
may form the initial corps trained specifically to facilitate these
discussions.
The style will likely parallel the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA)'72 mediations used to resolve disputes among
parents, teachers, counselors, therapists, and school administrators
concerning disabled children mainstreamed into public education. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court maintains a roster of Early Settlement
mediators specially trained for IDEA mediations under contract with the
State Department of Education. Although the style may track that of
IDEA, the system design would differ. Improvements described in Part
IV.B.2 could ameliorate some suboptimal aspects of IDEA mediations:
timing, mandatory nature of referrals, delegation of authority, and
compensation for personnel time.
In IDEA cases a multidisciplinary team develops an individualized
education plan (IEP) 73 which is a comprehensive assessment of the
child's full range of abilities and disabilities, used to guide educational
activities for the student. The IEP attempts to bridge the child's worlds
at home and at school to achieve coherence and cooperation among the
adults who are vital to the child's well-being. Although the IEP is far
from immutable, the exercise of creating an IEP has the capacity to focus
171. Sue Darst Tate, Director, Alternative Dispute Resolution System, Administrative
Office of the Courts, developed this project that brought together a cross-section of public and
private input to identify critical components of a successful model. Early Settlement adult
guardianship mediators are, like all others in the court-connected program, volunteers selected,
trained, and supervised to assure compliance with the Supreme Court's ethics code for
mediators. Adult guardianship mediators had already been certified at the basic level (twenty
hours of classroom instruction plus supervised postclassroom observations conducting small
claims court mediations) and had been certified in divorce and child custody mediation under
the Court's model (forty hours of classroom instruction plus supervised postclassroom
observation conducting actual mediations). They received a special twenty-hour training in
adult guardianship issues and advanced facilitation skills applicable to the family, medical,
social, and disability issues raised in adult guardianship matters. By definition, adult
guardianship cases presuppose a scenario of doubtful patient competency. Most mediated
medical treatment plans would presuppose sufficient competency to support informed self-
determination. Although the skills and training of the adult guardianship mediator may be more
extensive than needed for most mediated medical treatment plans, it would be valuable to have
this level of expertise "in reserve." Qualifying as a Mediator, Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12, ch. 37,
App. Rule II at 482.
172. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-19 (2000).
173. Id. § 1414.
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the team away from turf issues and towards the best interests of the
student. A productive, nonadversarial experience in such problem-
solving builds a positive foundation for future interactions between
parents and the school.
174
Typically, a successfully negotiated IEP can establish a baseline of
trust capable of sustaining good faith efforts through the inevitable
changes and crises that develop over time. When the initial IEP
development does not manage to create a productive baseline, or when
other issues have destabilized the IEP, the parent can request an IDEA
mediation to facilitate problem-solving with the team.175 Success of such
mediations varies, due at least in part to the style of mediation used, and
the perceived neutrality of the mediation process.
76
Compliance by schools and school districts often hinges on whether
the key administrators recognize that the large investment of time by staff
in a mediation is far less than the resources that would be invested in a
due process hearing. Otherwise, there can be concerns about the burden
placed upon the teachers, counselors, therapists and school administrators
whose time in mediation is not compensated. Under such conditions,
mediation itself can be resented.
The mediated medical treatment plan under discussion incorporates
knowledge gleaned from IDEA, adult guardianship, family, and other
mediations to craft a mediation model accessible and empowering to
beneficiaries, nonadversarial and supportive towards providers, and
efficient and cost-effective to the Medicare program.
174. Mediation of IDEA disputes "appeared to encourage parents, guardians, and school
officials to openly discuss their underlying concerns and interests, potentially laying the
groundwork for greater mutual understanding and more effective and constructive
relationships." Grace E. D'Alo, Accountability in Special Education Mediation: Many a Slip
'Twixt Vision and Practice?, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 20, 203 (2003).
175. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (2000) (describing the availability and requirements of
mediation procedures); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.506 (same). For a discussion of the successes and
continuing challenges in the substantive issues (defining disability, funding, and case-by-case
enforcement versus legislation), see Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons
from Special Education Legislation, 29 FoRDHAM URtB. L.J. 759 (Dec. 2001).
176. Professor D'Alo's study of IDEA in Pennsylvania notes that a transformative
approach-as discussed in this paper-may achieve far greater success in bringing IDEA's
vision in line with its practice, to further the goals of collaborative problem-solving and
relationship-building. See D'Alo, supra note 174, at 205. The new model developed by the
Pennsylvania working group closely follows that used by the Oklahoma Supreme Court for
nearly ten years, including the Early Settlement mediator skills evaluation. Id. at 223-38.
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2. Morality Follows Money
It is unquestioned that comprehensive geriatric assessments and treatment
plans developed pursuant to such assessments represent the right therapeutic
approach.17 7 Nevertheless, it remains a practice in only a minority of hospitals
and medical schools.
If it is undoubtedly the right thing to do as a matter of medical practice and
ethics, then why is it so rare? In a word: money. 78 Under current payment
structures, the time of the interdisciplinary team conducting the comprehensive
assessment and modifying the plan according to the needs of the patient and
caregiver largely goes unpaid. Although the physician's time is recognized,
that of others may not be factored in. Time spent in consultation with the
patient and caregiver as an integral part of developing and finalizing the plan
typically must go unrecognized.7 9 Programs that have adopted this approach
and have implemented it in full have relied upon outside grant funds to cover
these costs. Once such funding ends, the comprehensive model also likely
ends.
Medicare could advance its agenda of streamlining and humanizing
appeals by investing finances at the front end. Assuring compensation for all
providers of services in the comprehensive medical assessment (applicable to
both the elderly and to the disabled), coupled with compensation for time spent
mediating the medical treatment plan, would guarantee full implementation.
Once the plan has been finalized in writing and reviewed generally for
coverage, all services rendered pursuant to the plan should be deemed covered
177. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEHS-95-109, LONG-TERM CARE:
CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 5-6 (1995) (stating that a person's long-term care
needs cannot be determined from his or her medical diagnosis and explaining other ways to
determine a person's ability to function independently); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFCE,
GAO/T-PEMD-94-20, LONG-TERM CARE: THE NEED FOR GERIATRIC ASSESSMENT IN PUBLICLY
FUNDED HOME AND COMMUNiTY-BASED PROGRAMS (1994) (assessing what geriatric evaluation
is, how it is used, and the extent to which it is available in public programs).
178. See Cerminara, supra note 155, at 693 (explaining in reference to implementation of
the AMA's recommendations on end-of-life planning, "today's physicians know their individual
patients much less well than the traditional, prototypical family physician," and that "it is crucial
that the patient's caregivers know the patient's preferences, values, and beliefs in order to make
intelligent decisions" about the "gap" not covered in the standard check-off boxes of advance
directive forms). "Setting aside enough time to get to know a patient is difficult enough because
of the limited amount of time a physician can devote to each patient in the larger patient pool."
Id.
179. See, e.g., id. at 791 (suggesting with regard to end-of-life planning decisions that these
"should be the subject of open, honest, and meaningful conversation," and recommending that
the physician's time be compensated "on a fee-for-service basis rather than as part of regular
patient care covered by capitated payments").
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and paid promptly. These changes in billing could create a powerful and
lasting incentive for providers to make the necessary commitment of resources.
What would the Medicare program receive in return for its investment?
The program should see greater rationalization of services, major reductions in
disputes over coverage or denial of services, greatly reduced incentives to
practice costly, often inefficient "defensive medicine" to stave off malpractice
suits, and improved tools to implement continual quality improvement.1
8 0
Moreover, the Medicare program could forge the mechanism whereby the
doctor-patient relationship returns to its proper place as the primary therapeutic
tool.
180. As encouraged by U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-96-20, MEDICARE:
FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ENHANCE PATIENT QUALITY OF CARE 26-27 (1996), and as part of the
larger government-wide orientation toward collaboration to achieve continual quality
improvement, as seen in U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-454, PROGRAM EVALUATION:
AN EVALUATIVE CULTURE AND COLLABORATIVE PARTNERSHIPS HELP BUILD AGENCY CAPACITY
16-17 (2003) (concerning aspects of total quality management) and 20-23 (regarding state-
federal and public-private partnerships to access specific expertise).
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